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2Abstract
The present study employed the ‘parental misinformation’ paradigm to examine
whether individuals report false events from their childhood even when they are
interviewed in an appropriate manner by a trained interviewer.  Each participant was
interviewer on three occasions.  By the final interview, one participant produced a
‘full’ report, and six participants produced ‘partial’ reports of childhood events that
did not occur.  Whilst participants reported perceiving greater pressure to report the
false events than the real events, independent judges' ratings of social pressure in the
interviews did not differ as a function of what type of event participants were being
asked about.  Participants also reported higher confidence in their parents’, compared
to their own, recall of events from their childhood.  False reports were also positively
correlated with scores on both the full, and the revised, versions of the Dissociative
Experiences Scale, and negatively correlated with score on the Self-Monitoring scale.
These results indicate that, despite being interviewed in an appropriate manner by a
trained interviewer, some participants will falsely report events from their childhoods.
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4Introduction
This paper reports a partial extension and replication of the work by Loftus and
Pickrell (1995; see also Hyman, Husband, & Billings, 1995) on the use of the parental
misinformation paradigm in the creation of false ‘memories’ of childhood events.
This paradigm involves contacting participants’ parents and asking them to provide
details of events that did, or did not, happen during the participants’ childhood.  These
parental reports are then used as the basis for constructing interviews in which
participants are asked about both real (i.e. parentally-reported) and false (i.e.
experimenter-generated) events.
The use of ‘memory recovery’ techniques
In addition to using parental reports and repeated interviews, previous studies of false
memory creation in the laboratory have also employed a number of ‘memory
recovery’ techniques reportedly used by ‘recovered memory therapists’ (for example,
guided imagery, journalling, imagination, repeated suggestions, telling them that they
will be required to remember more during the next session; Loftus & Pickrell, 1995;
Hyman et al., 1995; Hyman & Billings, 1998; Porter, Yuille & Lehman, 1999).  It is
argued that the use of such techniques is likely to increase the chance of clients
coming to believe, or at least report, falsely, that certain events happened to them
when they did not (Lindsay & Read, 1994, 2001).  Crucially, however, we do not yet
know what the baseline is for false reports in interviews using the parental
misinformation paradigm, where such additional suggestive techniques and
procedures are not used.
5The only exception to this is the first experiment reported by Hyman et al. (1995) in
which, although participants were not encouraged to use any specific ‘memory
recovery’ techniques, they were nevertheless informed participants that the goal of the
research was to “investigate how much [the participant] could remember by the end of
the second session” (p. 185).  They also explicitly asked participants to think about
the events between sessions.   Whilst not highly suggestive, this explicit instruction to
remember more before the next session and to think about the events between
sessions might have led participants to engage in some kind of memory recovery
between interview sessions.
To our knowledge no study to date has examined the effects of the parental
misinformation paradigm alone, without the use of other suggestive techniques.  The
first aim of the present study, therefore, was to examine the ‘baseline’ level of false
reporting of childhood events using the parental misinformation paradigm when
trained interviewers conduct the interviews.
Social pressure
Even if participants are questioned in an appropriate manner, the suggestive nature of
the parental misinformation paradigm is itself likely to introduce social pressures into
the interviews.  As noted by Register and Kihlstrom (1988), repeatedly asking
someone about the same event can, in certain contexts, act as a kind of implicit
negative feedback that the person did not ‘get it right’ the first time they were asked.
With regard to false childhood memory research this issue of social pressure has been
noted but not yet explicitly explored, with only vague indications given in the
description of the experimental procedure of what level of pressure was involved (e.g.
6Loftus & Pickrell, 1995, p. 722).  Whilst researchers have attempted to operationalise
different degrees of social pressure (e.g. Malinoski & Lynn, 1999), the precise
relationship between actual and experienced social pressure in interviews and the
likelihood of falsely reporting childhood events has yet to be established.
However, in related areas of psychology, social pressure has been found to be an
important factor that can lead people, for example, to confess falsely in police
interrogations (Gudjonsson, 2003; Ofshe, 1989; Pearse & Gudjonsson, 1999).  Several
researchers have also noted the possible role of social pressure in relation to claims of
childhood sexual abuse (see Brown, 1995; Kluft, 1999; Ost, Costall, & Bull, 2001;
2002).  Therefore, the second aim of the present study was to monitor the level of
social pressure in interviews and examine any possible relationship with false
reporting.
Individual differences
The third aim of the present study was to follow up and extend recent research that
has examined the influence of various individual differences on false reports of
childhood events.  The Dissociative Experiences Scale version C (DES, Bernstein &
Putnam, 1986; Waller, Putnam, & Carlson, 1996; DESc, adapted for use with non-
clinical samples by Wright & Loftus, 1999) was included, as previous research has
demonstrated that it correlates positively with measures of false memory creation
(Hyman & Billings, 1998).  The explanation for this effect is that individuals who
score highly on this measure experience more disruptions in the integration of
thoughts, awareness and memory and therefore may be more prone to accepting
external information as a personal memory  (Candel, Merckelbach & Kuijpers, 2003;
Hyman & Billings, 1998; Merckelbach, Muris & Rassin, 1999; Ost, Fellows & Bull,
71997; see also Eisen & Carlson, 1998; Qin & Johnson, in press).  The Self Monitoring
scale (SM, Snyder, 1974) was included because higher scores on this scale have been
found to be associated with false reporting, suggesting that false memories may be
more likely to be reported by individuals who are more ‘eager to please’ the
investigator (Ost, Vrij, Costall, & Bull, 2002; see also Gudjonsson, 1995).  Finally,
the Gudjonsson Compliance Scale (GCS, Gudjonsson, 1989) was included as a direct
self-report measure of a person’s susceptibility, when under pressure, to comply with
instructions from an authority figure.  It might be the case that, when questioned by an
allegedly ‘authoritative’ interviewer (i.e. one who access to detailed information about
their past), participants may well comply with that authority figure and claim to
remember events when, in fact, they do not (Gudjonsson, 2003).
Participants’ confidence in the source of the misinformation
The final aim of the present study was to follow up previous findings regarding
confidence and false reporting.  Several studies have found that participants report
being significantly less confident when recalling ‘false’ events compared to when
recalling ‘true’ events (Hyman & Billings, 1998; Porter et al., 1999; Wade, Garry,
Read, & Lindsay, 2002).  There is, however, an additional question that has yet to be
explored in adult participants, namely the perceived credibility of the source of the
misinformation.  Research has shown that children are more likely to incorporate
misinformation if it is presented by credible source (Lampinen & Smith, 1995;
Pornpitakpan, 2004).  Thus, in the present study, we explored (although we did not
explicitly manipulate) participants’ confidence in their own recall, as well as their
confidence in the source of the misinformation (in this case their confidence in their
parents’ accurate recall of events).
8Method
Participants
A total of 31 participants (four males and 27 females) completed all three interview
sessions.  The ages of the participants ranged from 18 to 38 years (M = 19.84 yrs, SD
= 3.5 yrs).  Fifteen of the participants took part in order to gain course credits from the
department's participant pool scheme, and the remaining 16 were paid £20 for their
participation1.  All participants were first-year psychology undergraduates who
responded to a notice asking for participants for a study entitled “Memories of
Childhood.”
Procedure
Participants were recruited via a notice displayed in the Psychology Department.
Participants then contacted the first author who obtained a contact address for the
participants’ parent(s).  Consent was then obtained to send a questionnaire to the
participants' parent(s) and the participants were thanked and told that they would be
contacted once the questionnaire had been returned.  Participants were advised at this
stage that it was important that they should not discuss the contents of the
questionnaire with their parents.  A covering letter accompanied by the Childhood
Events Questionnaire (CEQ) was sent to the participants’ parent(s).  The CEQ asked
participants’ parents to provide details of a list of eight events that may, or may not,
have occurred to the participant as a child.  The eight events were similar to those that
have been used in previous research, and consisted of: going to hospital, becoming
                                                
1
 An important point raised by one reviewer was the possibility that the participants who were paid
were more motivated than participants who were receiving course credit.  We agree with this
suggestion however, unfortunately, we did not record which participants were paid £20 and which
participated in return for course credit.
9lost, an eventful family holiday, an eventful birthday celebration, wedding attended,
winning a contest, death of a friend or relative, and a serious accident involving a
friend or family member.  Participants' parents were asked to provide one example of
each of these events.  If more than one such event occurred they were asked to
provide details on the event that they considered the most memorable to their child.
Parents were asked explicitly to state if no such event occurred (by writing ‘did not
occur’).  A covering letter emphasised the importance of not discussing information in
any of the questionnaires with their daughter/son.  A pre-paid envelope was provided
for parents to return the questionnaires.
Once the questionnaires had been returned, participants were contacted (either by
telephone or electronic mail) and three interview sessions were arranged.  All of the
sessions were video-, and audio-recorded.  In each of the three interview sessions,
participants were asked about one parentally-reported event and one experimenter-
created event (the same events were used during all three interviews).  There were six
interviewers (all female) who each interviewed the same participant on each of the
three separate occasions.
Selection and presentation of events
For each participant two events were selected.  For the parentally-reported event, the
most detailed event was used.  The experimenter-created event was selected on the
basis that a participant’s parents had explicitly reported that such an event had not
occurred.  Also, for ethical reasons, it was inappropriate to suggest to participants that
they had witnessed the death of a close friend or relative, hence this event was not
used as the basis for any of the experimenter-created events.  In order to control for
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possible age effects, the experimenter-created events were, on average, suggested as
having occurred at the same age (6.00 years) as the parentally-reported event (6.85
years).  Both events were presented to the participants as having been provided by
their parents.  The interviewers were blind as to the source of the event information
(i.e. whether it was a parentally-reported or experimenter-created event)2.  In line with
the methodology developed by Loftus and Pickrell (1995) and Hyman et al. (1995),
the experimenter-created event was always the second event that participants were
asked about.
Interview structure
All interview sessions took place in the observation suite in the Psychology
department.  The six interviewers (all female) attended an interviewer training session
conducted by the fourth author.  This ensured that they were all familiar with
techniques of appropriate interviewing which emphasised the importance of gaining
rapport and of following the phased approach (Milne & Bull, 1999; 2003) as
recommended in Government guidance in the United Kingdom (Home Office, 2002).
At the beginning of each interview session interviewers were provided with an
interview sheet for each participant (one sheet per event).  The interview sheets firstly
gave a brief instruction for the interviewer to read to the participant in order to orient
the participant toward the general nature of the event that they would be asked about,
for example:
"Your parents have told us about a time when you went to hospital as a child.
Can you remember anything about that?"
                                                
2
 At the end of the study one interviewer (a psychology postgraduate student) confessed that she had
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Interview session one
The interviewer read the orientating statement to the participant and then asked them
to recall freely whatever information they could about that event.  If the participant
reported an event that was not the parentally-reported event, the interviewer informed
the participant that they were reporting the wrong event.  Underneath this general
event information was a list of between five and six prompts.  When the participant
had finished their free recall, the interviewer then read out the following prompts.
These prompts, in order, consisted of the following information that had been gained
from their parents of the general event details: age of child at the time, where event
happened, emotional responses of child, what happened, who was involved, and any
other detail that came to mind.
For the experimenter-created events, the general orienting statement and order of
prompts was the same but the events used were ones that had been reported as having
happened to other participants in this sample.  Experimenter-created events were
therefore always based on another participant's parentally-reported event (e.g.
participant X’s experimenter-created event was based on a parentally-reported event
that had been given for participant Y).  In this way it was hoped that the
experimenter-created event would be a plausible, yet relatively unique event
containing novel details.  All participants were read all the prompts that had been
provided for both events and the number of prompts was held constant across both
event types for that participant (i.e. if the parentally-reported event contained five
prompts, then five prompts were also used for the experimenter-created event).
                                                                                                                                           
guessed that one of the events had not occurred, yet three of the interviewers (non-psychology
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The interviewers were simply instructed to obtain from the participant as much detail
as they could with regard to the two events using free recall and as few, or as many, of
the prompts as they deemed necessary (given the ‘control’ of this mentioned above).
At the end of this interview session, participants were reminded that it was important
they should not discuss the events with their parents before the end of the study.  The
interviewer and participant then arranged a time to meet again in approximately one
week’s time.  Unlike previous studies, participants were not told that they would be
asked about the same two events the following week, nor were they encouraged to
engage in any kind of memory-recovery exercises (e.g. thinking about each of the
events for five minutes a day).
Interview session two
The procedure for the second interview session was identical to the first except that,
prior to reading the general orienting statement, participants were asked whether they
had discussed events from the previous week with their parents (see below).
Participants were again read the general orienting statements and asked to recall freely
whatever information they could about the two events.  At the end of this interview
session participants were again reminded that they should not discuss the events with
their parents, and the time of the third and final interview session was arranged.
Interview session three
The procedure for the third and final interview was the same as for the first two
sessions.  After this final interview ended, participants completed a brief
                                                                                                                                           
postgraduate students) expressed surprise at being told this.
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questionnaire that asked them, amongst other items, how pressured they felt to recall
each event (on a scale from one to seven where a score of one meant ‘no pressure’
and a score of seven meant ‘highly pressured) and how confident they were that they
(as well as their parents) had accurately recalled the events (also on a scale of one to
seven, where a score of one meant 'not at all confident' and a score of seven meant
'highly confident').  Finally, participants were asked to complete the Gudjonsson
Compliance Scale (Gudjonsson, 1989), the Dissociative Experiences Scale (DESc,
Bernstein & Putnam, 1986; Wright & Loftus, 1999), and the Self Monitoring Scale
(Snyder, 1974).  Order of presentation of the questionnaires was counter-balanced.
After they had completed the individual differences measures, participants were then
asked again whether they had, at any point during the study, discussed with their
parents any of the events they had been asked about.  They were reassured that there
was no penalty had they done so.  At this stage four participants admitted that they
had tried to discuss the events (usually the experimenter-created event) with their
parents, but that the parents had flatly refused to talk about it.  Participants were then
debriefed and asked whether they had any questions or concerns about the study.
They were then thanked for their participation, debriefed, and either paid twenty
pounds, or provided with a participant pool credit sheet.
Independent judge’s rating of social pressure in interviews
In order to investigate possible differences in the way in which interviewers
questioned participants about the two different event types, one independent judge
rated the social pressure in each set of interviews on a scale of one to seven (where a
score of one meant 'no pressure' and a score of seven meant 'highly pressured') by
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watching the videotapes of each session.  There were no explicit criteria for judging
social pressure and the judge’s rating was based on the overall impression of the judge
of the degree of coercion, requests for more information, inappropriate uses of silence
and so forth in each set of interviews.  A second judge rated a subset of the interviews
in order to provide an inter-rater analysis.
Results
Baseline rates of false memory
Two raters (JO and SF) initially classified all of the memory reports (parentally-
reported and experimenter-created) according to the criteria devised by Porter et al.
(1999), based upon the video-recordings and transcripts of the interviews.  Porter et
al.’s criteria are as follows: (1) participant reported remembering the suggested event;
(2) the participant agreed with and/or incorporated the information clues (prompts)
into the memory report; (3) the participant reported more information than the
information clues (prompts); (4) the incident was not remembered upon its initial
presentation; and (5) in debriefing, the participant reported not discussing the event at
any time during the study period.  If all of these criteria were fulfilled then the
participant was rated as having provided a ‘full’ false report.  If the participant
reported that they remembered the event but, for example, provided no more
information than had been provided in the prompts, or indicated that they were unsure
it was a ‘real’ memory, then the participant was rated as having provided a ‘partial’
false report.  If none of these criteria were fulfilled then the participant was rated as
providing ‘no’ false report.  The actual events (both parentally-, and experimenter-
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created) that participants were asked to recall and the mean age at which the events
occurred are shown in Table 1.
(Table 1 about here)
As also shown in Table 1, by the final interview, of the total of 31 participants, 5
(16.1%) were scored as having given ‘no’ report of the parentally-reported event, 6
(19.4%) were scored as having given a ‘partial’ report, and 20 (64.5%) were scored as
having given a ‘full’ report.  By the final interview, 24 participants (77.4%) were
scored as having given ‘no’ report of the experimenter-created event, six participants
(18.6%) were scored as having given a ‘partial’ report, and only one participant (3%)
was scored as having given a ‘full’ report (see appendix I for an extract from this
‘full’ false report).  Thus a total of seven participants (22.6%), according to Porter et
al.’s (1999) criteria, produced either a ‘full’, or a ‘partial’ report of the experimenter-
created event by the final interview.  These levels of false reporting are similar to
those found by Loftus and Pickrell (1995) and Hyman et al. (1995) but are much
lower than those reported by Porter et al. (1999).
Age effects
Although the parentally-reported events occurred at a slightly later age (M=6.85 yrs,
SD=7.88) than the experimenter-created events (M=6.00 yrs, SD=1.83) this difference
was not significantly different, t(60) = 1.80, p>.05.  There was no difference between
the ages at which the parentally-reported events occurred and whether participants
provided a ‘full’ report, a ‘partial’ report, or ‘no’ report of that event, Chi2(2)=2.77,
p>.05.  There was also no difference between the ages at which the experimenter-
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created event was suggested to have occurred as a function of whether participants
provided a ‘full’, ‘partial’, or ‘no’ report of that event, Chi2(2)=1.76, p>.05.
(Table 2 about here)
Judge’s ratings of social pressure in the interviews
Overall, the judge’s mean ratings of social pressure (on a scale of one = ‘low’ to
seven = ‘high’) in the interviews were relatively low (parentally-reported events,
M=2.00, SD=0.89; experimenter-generated events, M=1.96, SD=1.01).  The judge’s
estimates of the amount of pressure did not differ as a function of whether the
participant was being asked about a parentally-reported or an experimenter-created
event, t(30)=0.24, p>.05, d=0.043.  This suggests that the training the interviewers
received ensured that they interviewed participants in an appropriate manner.
Participants’ ratings of social pressure in the interviews
In contrast to the low levels of social pressure observed by the independent judge,
participants gave significantly higher ratings of perceived social pressure in relation to
trying to remember experimenter-created than in relation to parentally-reported
events, t(30)=-2.88, p<.01, d=0.63 (see Table 2).  However, there was no correlation
between participants’ self-reports of perceived social pressure in the interviews and
the levels of recall for the experimenter-created events (Kendall’s Tau_b=-.057,
p>.05).   Overall, the mean scores therefore indicate that, even given the appropriate
nature of the interviewing, participants still felt a degree of social pressure to report
                                                
3
 A second judge rated the social pressure in thirteen of the interviews to provide an inter-rater
reliability analysis of the first judge’s ratings.  Kendall’s Tau_b correlations indicated that both judges
were relatively consistent in their ratings of social pressure across both event types: Parentally-reported
events - Kendall’s Tau_b = .79, p<.005; experimenter-created events – Kendall’s Tau_b = .80, p<.005.
All cases of disagreement were no more than one rating category apart.
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details of both types of event, and felt significantly more pressure to try and
remember the experimenter-generated event than the parentally-reported event.
Personality variables and false memory
As shown in Table 3, the findings of previous studies were replicated regarding the
positive correlation between participants’ scores on the Dissociative Experiences
Scale (DESc) and their levels of recall for experimenter-created events (Kendall’s
Tau_b=.256, p<.05).  Thus our findings confirm those of earlier research that suggest
that high scores on the DESc are associated with higher levels of susceptibility to
suggestion (Candel et al., 2003; Eisen & Carlson, 1998; Hyman & Billings, 1998;
Merckelbach et al., 1999; Ost et al., 1997).  However, Waller et al. (1996) have
argued that only a subset of eight items on the DESc questionnaire is needed to
discriminate pathological from non-pathological ‘dissociators’ (i.e. those who are
likely to be at risk of suffering dissociative disorders).  We reanalysed our DESc data
in the light of Waller, et al.’s (1996) proposal, using only the eight items they suggest
(as opposed to the 28 items in the original scale), producing the new DESt score.  In
fact the correlation between this revised scale and levels of false recall was very
similar to that for the full scale (Kendall’s Tau_b=.312, p<.05). The significant
relationship between scores on the DESt and levels of false reporting is important
because it suggests that this subset of items, as well as being related to pathological
dissociation, are also related to suggestibility (see also Eisen & Carlson, 1998).
Furthermore, as shown in Table 3, there were significant positive correlations
between the DESc, the DESt, and the GCS, which suggest that there may be a
relationship between dissociative experiences and compliant responding (see also
Merckelbach, Muris, Horselenberg, & Stougie, 2000).  A negative correlation was
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also found between participants’ scores on the Self Monitoring scale (Snyder, 1974)
and levels of false recall (Kendall’s Tau_b=-.336, p<.05).  Individuals who scored
highly on the self-monitoring scale were therefore less likely to report false details of
the childhood events (cf. Ost et al., 2002).  No relationship was found between
participants’ scores on the Gudjonsson Compliance Scale (Gudjonsson, 1989) and
levels of false reporting (Kendall’s Tau_b=.004, p>.05).
(table 3 about here)
Participants’ confidence in their reports of childhood events
We analysed the confidence ratings that were given by participants after the final
interview in relation to both the parentally-reported events and the experimenter-
created events.  As shown in Table 2, participants’ confidence ratings that they had
remembered the parentally-reported events accurately were significantly higher
(M=4.64, SD=1.58) than their confidence ratings that they had accurately
remembered the experimenter-created event (M=2.87, SD=2.32), t(30) = 3.91,
p<.005, d=0.89.
We also asked how confident participants were that their parents had accurately
remembered the events (see Table 2).  Again, participants gave significantly higher
ratings for their confidence in their parents’ recall for the parentally-reported event
than for the experimenter-created event, t(30) = 2.42, p<.05, d=0.46.  Participants
gave significantly higher ratings of confidence in their parents’ recall of the events
than their own for both the parentally-reported (participant M=4.64, SD, 1.58, parent
M=5.58, SD=1.40), t(30)=-2.52, p<.05, d=0.62, and for the experimenter-created
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event (participant M=2.87, SD=2.32, parent M=4.74, SD=2.12), t(30)=-3.24, p<.005,
d=0.80.
Discussion
One of the concerns voiced in the literature (e.g. Ofshe & Watters, 1994) is that
‘false’ memories of childhood sexual abuse may be ‘caused’ by therapists
recommending the use of certain ‘memory recovery’ techniques to those in their care
and misleading them to report events that did not occur.  The main finding of the
present study, however, was that just under a quarter of participants (22.6%) reported
details of childhood events that did not occur, even when interviewed in an
appropriate manner about those events by trained interviewers.  Furthermore, both the
judges' and participants' ratings of social pressure were low, possibly indicating that
the suggestive nature of the parental misinformation procedure itself appears to be
sufficient to produce such reports.  The level of false reporting was consistent with the
earlier studies of laboratory false memories (e.g. Loftus & Pickrell, 1995; Hyman et
al., 1995), but much lower than that obtained more recent studies (e.g. Porter et al.,
1999).  This raises questions concerning what it might be about this misinformation
procedure that leads participants, in the absence of specific ‘memory recovery’
techniques, to come to report details of events that they did not experience.  The
present study addressed three possibilities: social pressure, individual differences, and
participants’ confidence in the source of the misleading information (i.e. their parents’
alleged reports of event from their childhood).
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Social pressure
Despite the fact that an independent judge gave consistently low ratings of social
pressure in the interviews, participants nevertheless reported that they felt under more
pressure to recall the experimenter-created events, compared to the parentally
reported events.  However, this pressure in itself did not lead our participants to make
false reports of such events.  Nevertheless, it is difficult to assess comprehensively the
impact that social pressure had on false reports because social pressure was not
experimentally manipulated.  Future research should examine the effects of
manipulating experimentally the levels of social pressure, perhaps by comparing
participants who are encouraged to try to remember as much as they can to
participants who are not (see Malinoski & Lynn, 1999), by comparing trained
interviewers with interviewers who have not received any training, or by comparing
participants who are asked to engage in ‘memory recovery’ techniques compared to
those who are not.
Individual differences
In line with previous research (e.g. Hyman & Billings, 1998; Eisen & Carlson, 1998;
Porter et al., 1999) positive correlations were found between the Dissociative
Experiences Scale (DESc, Wright & Loftus, 1999) and levels of recall for the
experimenter-generated event.  Interestingly, a positive correlation was also found
between levels of false recall and scores on the shortened version of the DESc, the
DESt (cf. Waller et al., 1996).  In light of the correlation with scores on the GCS,
future research should be directed towards examining its relationship, both with
compliance, and with self-reports of traumatic or emotional events (e.g. Merckelbach,
et al., 2000).  Of course, caution must be exercised in any interpretation of the
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correlation between the DESc, DESt, GCS, and false reports given, firstly, the limited
sample size and, secondly, that the correlational analysis does not allow the inference
of cause and effect relationships.  A negative relationship was found between scores
on the self-monitoring scale (Snyder, 1974) and levels of false recall that stands in
contrast to previous research (e.g. Ost et al., 2002).  One tentative explanation might
be that high self-monitors were aware that they were not reading any cues from the
interviewer that they should report as much as they could about the false event and
therefore complied with this in order to appear to be good experimental participants.
The other explanation is that high self-monitors were simply more cautious and
monitored their responses more carefully than low self monitors.
Confidence
Participants reported having greater confidence overall in their parents’ memory than
their own, regardless of which event they were asked about.  In one sense this finding
is not surprising given that the events related to the participants’ childhoods.
However, there was no relationship between participants’ confidence in their parents’
memory and the levels of recall for either the parentally-reported, or the experimenter-
created event.  In other words, although participants reported having more confidence
in what their parents had allegedly reported, this did not necessarily lead them to
report that they remembered more about either event (conversely, the fact that a
participant remembered more about an event did not lead them to rate their parents’
recall more highly).  Perhaps, rather than examining confidence, future research
should address how credible participants rated the accounts that were (allegedly)
given by their parents (see Lampinen & Smith, 1995; Pornpitakpan, 2004).
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Future research
Future research should therefore address the effects of systematically varying the
levels of social pressure both on the production of reports of parentally-reported and
experimenter-created events, and also the effect this might have on reports produced
by more dissociative, compliant, or high self-monitoring individuals.  Research
should also examine whether the use of inappropriate interviewing techniques, or the
use of ‘memory recovery’ techniques increases the inherent pressure on participants
to produce a report.  Research should also address in more detail factors that may alter
the perceived authority, or credibility, of the source of (mis)information (see
Pornpitakpan, 2004 for a review).  For example, research has demonstrated that
misinformation is more likely to be accepted when it is presented by an authority
figure (Paddock & Terranova, 2001; Roper & Shewan, 2002), by an interviewer who
behaves authoritatively (Bull & Corran, 2003), or by a confederate wearing dark
clothes (Vrij, Pannell & Ost, in press).  These issues all need further exploration with
regards to false reports of childhood events.
23
References
Bernstein, E. M. & Putnam, F. W. (1986). Development, reliability and validity of a
dissociation scale. Journal of Nervous and Mental Diseases, 74, 727-735.
Brown, D. (1995). Sources of suggestion and their applicability to psychotherapy. In
J. Alpert (Ed.), Sexual abuse recalled (pp. 61-100). Northvale, NJ: Jason
Aronson.
Bull, R. & Corran, E. (2003). Interviewing child witnesses: Past and future.
International Journal of Police Science and Management, 4, 315-322.
Candel, I., Merckelbach, H. & Kuijpers, M. (2003). Dissociative experiences are
related to commissions in emotional memory. Behaviour Research and
Therapy, 41, 719-725.
Eisen, M. L. & Carlson, E. B. (1998). Individual differences in suggestibility:
Examining the influence of dissociation, absorption, and a history of
childhood abuse. Applied Cognitive Psychology, 12, S47-S61.
Gudjonsson, G. H. (1989). Compliance in an interrogative situation: A new scale.
Personality and Individual Differences, 10, 535-540.
Gudjonsson, G. H. (1995) ‘I’ll help you boys as much as I can’: how eagerness to
please can result in a false confession. The Journal of Forensic Psychiatry, 6,
333-342.
24
Gudjonsson, G. H. (2003). The psychology of interrogations, confessions and
testimony (2nd edition). Chichester, UK: John Wiley & Sons.
Home Office. (2002). Achieving best evidence in criminal proceedings: Guidance for
vulnerable or intimidated witnesses, including children. London: Her
Majesty’s Stationery Office.
Hyman, I. E. Jr. & Billings, F. J. (1998). Individual differences and the creation of
false childhood memories. Memory, 6, 1-20.
Hyman, I. E. Jr., Husband, T. H. & Billings, F. J. (1995). False memories of
childhood experiences. Applied Cognitive Psychology, 9, 181-197.
Kluft, R. P. (1999). True lies, false truths, and naturalistic raw data: Applying clinical
research findings to the false memory debate. In L. M. Williams and V. L.
Banyard (Eds.), Trauma and memory (pp. 319-329). Thousand Oaks, CA:
Sage Publications.
Lampinen, J. M. & Smith, V. L. (1995). The incredible (and sometimes incredulous)
child witness: Child eyewitnesses’ sensitivity to source credible cues. Journal
of Applied Psychology, 80, 621-627.
25
Lindsay, D. S. & Read, J. D. (1994). Psychotherapy and memories of childhood
sexual abuse: A cognitive perspective. Applied Cognitive Psychology, 8, 281-
338.
Lindsay, D. S. & Read, J. D. (2001). The recovered memories controversy: where do
we go from here? In G. M. Davies & T. Dalgleish (Eds.), Recovered
memories: Seeking the middle ground (pp. 71-93). Chichester, UK: Wiley.
Loftus, E. F. & Pickrell, J. E. (1995). The formation of false memories. Psychiatric
Annals, 25, 720-725.
Malinoski, P. T. & Lynn, S. J. (1999). The plasticity of early memory reports: Social
pressure, hypnotizability, compliance, and interrogative suggestibility. The
International Journal of Clinical and Experimental Hypnosis, 47, 320-245.
Merckelbach, H., Muris, P., Horselenberg, R. & Stougie, S. (2000). Dissociative
experiences, response bias, and fantasy proneness in college students.
Personality and Individual Differences, 28, 49-58.
Merckelbach, H., Muris, P. & Rassin, E. (1999). Fantasy proneness and cognitive
failures as correlates of dissociative experiences. Personality and Individual
Differences, 26, 961-967.
Milne, R. & Bull, R. (1999). Investigative interviewing: Psychology and practice.
Chichester, UK: John Wiley & Sons.
26
Milne, R. & Bull, R. (2003). Police interviewing.  In D. Carson and R. Bull (Eds.)
Handbook of Psychology in Legal Contexts (2nd edition). Chichester, UK:
John Wiley & Sons.
Ofshe, R. (1989). Coerced confessions: The logic of seemingly irrational action.
Cultic Studies Journal, 6, 1-15.
Ofshe, R. & Watters, E. (1994). Making monsters: False memories, psychotherapy,
and sexual hysteria. New York: Scribners.
Ost, J., Costall, A. & Bull, R. (2001). False confessions and false memories? A model
for understanding retractors’ experiences?  The Journal of Forensic Psychiatry,
12, 551-581.
Ost, J., Costall, A. & Bull, R. (2002). A perfect symmetry? A study of retractors’
experiences of making and then repudiating claims of early sexual abuse.
Psychology, Crime & Law, 8, 155-181.
Ost, J., Fellows, B. J. & Bull, R. (1997). Individual differences and the suggestibility
of human memory. Contemporary Hypnosis, 14, 132-137.
Ost, J., Vrij, A., Costall, A. & Bull, R. (2002). Crashing memories and reality
monitoring: distinguishing between perceptions, imaginings and false
memories. Applied Cognitive Psychology, 16, 125-134.
27
Paddock, J. R. & Terranova, S. (2001). Guided visualization and suggestibility: Effect
of perceived authority on recall of autobiographical memories. Journal of
Genetic Psychology, 162, 347-356.
Pearse, J. & Gudjonsson, G. H. (1999). Measuring influential police interviewing
tactics: A factor analytical approach. Legal and Criminological Psychology, 4,
221-238.
Pornpitakpan, C. (2004). The persuasiveness of source credibility: A critical review of
five decades’ evidence. Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 34, 243-281.
Porter, S., Yuille, J. C. & Lehman, D. R. (1999). The nature of real, implanted, and
fabricated memories for emotional childhood events: implications for the
recovered memory debate. Law and Human Behavior, 23, 517-537.
Qin, J. J. & Johnson, M. (in press). Dissociative tendency and source monitoring.
Applied Cognitive Psychology.
Register, P.A. & Kihlstrom, J. F. (1988). Hypnosis and interrogative suggestibility.
Personality and Individual Differences, 9, 549-558.
Roper, R. & Shewan, D. (2002). Compliance and eyewitness testimony: Do
eyewitnesses comply with misleading 'expert pressure' during investigative
interviewing? Legal and Criminological Psychology, 7, 155-163.
28
Snyder, M. (1974). The self-monitoring of expressive behavior. Journal of Personality
and Social Psychology, 30, 526-537.
Vrij, A., Pannell, H. & Ost, J. (in press). The influence of social pressure and black
clothing on crime judgements. Psychology, Crime & Law.
Wade, K. A., Garry, M., Read, J. D. & Lindsay, D. S. (2002). A picture is worth a
thousand lies: Using false photographs to create false childhood memories.
Psychonomic Bulletin and Review, 9, 597-603.
Waller, N. G., Putnam, F. W. & Carlson, E. B. (1996). Types of dissociation and
dissociative types: A taxometric analysis of dissociative experiences.
Psychological Methods, 1, 300-321.
Wright, D. B. & Loftus, E. F. (1999). Measuring dissociation: Comparison of
alternative forms of the dissociative experiences scale. American Journal of
Psychology, 112, 497-519.
29
Table 1. The number of reports of parentally-reported and experimenter-created
events (including mean age and description) produced in the final interview (N=31).
Parentally-reported events Experimenter-created events
Full report (64.5%), n=20 Mean age
(SD)
Full report (3%), n=1 Age
Hospital (n=5), lost (n=3), holiday
(n=3), birthday (n=3), wedding (n=1),
contest (n=4), accident (n=1)
7.25 yrs
(1.83)
Hospital (n=1) 4 yrs
Partial report (19.4%), n=6 Mean age
(SD)
Partial report (18.6%), n=6 Mean age
(SD)
Holiday (n=1), birthday (n=3),
wedding (n=1), accident (n=1)
6.58 yrs
(1.85)
Hospital (n=3), birthday (n=1),
wedding (n=1), contest (n=1)
6.08 yrs
(1.90)
No report (16.1%), n=5 Mean age
(SD)
No report (77.4%), n=24 Mean age
(SD)
Hospital (n=1), lost (n=1), birthday
(n=1), contest (n=1), accident (n=1)
5.60 yrs
(1.81)
Hospital (n=5), lost (n=9),
birthday (n=3), wedding (n=1),
contest (n=5), accident (n=1)
6.06 yrs
(1.85)
6.85 yrs
(1.88)
6.00 yrs
(1.83)
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Table 2. Mean ratings of perceived social pressure to recall, and confidence in,
parentally-reported and experimenter-created events (N = 31).
Dependent measure Parentally-
reported events
Experimenter-
created events
Participants’ mean rating of social pressure ** 3.32 (1.57) 4.41 (1.87)
Participants’ confidence in their own recall *** 4.64 (1.58) 2.87 (2.32)
Participants’ confidence in their parents’ recall * 5.58 (1.40) 4.74 (2.12)
Note: *** p < .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05
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Table 3: Kendall’s Tau_b correlations between levels of false reporting (FR) and
individual differences measures (N=31)
Level of FR DESc DESt GCS SM
Level of FR --- .256 * .312 * .004 ns -.336 *
DESc --- .787 ** .291 * .135 ns
DESt --- .296 * .081 ns
GCS --- -.079 ns
SM ---
* denotes p<.05, ** denotes p<.001, ns denotes p>.05
N.B. The correlations between the level of false reporting and the DESc / DESt were
one-tailed.  All remaining correlations were two-tailed.
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Appendix I
Example of full false report.
Initial interview (week 1):
Interviewer:  “Your parents have told use about a time when you went to the hospital
as a child.  Can you remember anything about that?” (The following prompts were
then read out when the participant claimed not to remember the event in question).
“You were 4 years old at the time (prompt 1).  It happened whilst you were at home
(prompt 2).  You were upset (prompt 3).  You couldn’t stand up and kept falling back
asleep (prompt 4).  Your father was there (prompt 5).  You were taken to hospital
where they diagnosed you as having low blood sugar (prompt 6).”
Participant: “It was when I was living in [place name]? No I can’t remember anything
about the hospital or the place. It was [place name] general hospital where my mum
used to work? She used to work in the baby ward there … but I can’t… no. I know if I
was put under hypnosis or something I’d be able to remember it better, but I honestly
can’t remember.”
Second interview (week 2):
Interviewer: “OK onto the second one. Going to hospital”
Participant: “I’ve been thinking some more about this, but I can’t… I still can’t easily
picture it … I can remember the giant [place name] hospital … it was like of the
biggest places I ever saw when I was about 4 years old …  I think it might have had a
couple of giant long corridors, which worried me a little bit. I can’t remember much
about when I was seriously ill [pause]. Obviously I was upset at the time. Mum and
dad noticed that I was seriously ill … it’s too difficult for me to remember.  I can’t…”
Final interview (week 3):
Interviewer: “OK. The second event … going to hospital.”
Participant: “I was living in [place name] at the time. It must have been on a Sunday
because my dad was there. He was always around on a Sunday … so I guess I must
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have passed out a lot from what I can gather. I think my mum was panicking quite a
lot that I kept passing out. I don’t remember much. I don’t remember the trip to the
hospital because I think I was probably out cold at the time …  but from what I can
gather, my dad must have rushed me to the hospital … I don’t remember much about
the hospital except I know that it is a massive, huge place. I was 5 years old at the
time and I was like “oh my god I don’t really want to go into this place, you know it’s
awful” … but I had no choice. They did a blood test on me and found out that I had a
low blood sugar. I think that was about it. But I can’t remember the event particularly
well.  Probably because I was passed out quite a lot of the time.”
